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Filling the Criminal Liability Gap for Private Military Contractors Abroad:  





 On September 16, 2007, private military contractors (PMCs) employed by Blackwater 
Worldwide allegedly shot and killed 14 unarmed Iraqi civilians and wounded 20 others in Nisoor 
Square, a crowded traffic intersection in downtown Baghdad.1  On December 31, 2009, U.S. 
District Court Judge Ricardo Urbina dismissed the indictment charges brought by the U.S. 
government against five Blackwater contractors involved in the disputed incident,2 and in the 
process unleashed a wave of Iraqi anger and disbelief over the failure to prosecute the deadly 
shooting that had already inflamed anti-American tensions.3  While the U.S. government will 
appeal the dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, prosecutors face a steep 
uphill climb to overturn U.S. District Judge Urbina’s critical and detailed ruling.4  How did the 
Department of Justice’s investigation and criminal prosecution of these individuals fail, even 
before reaching trial?  The answer lies in an ambiguous statute that creates a confusing legal 
framework as it applies to PMCs in Iraq and Afghanistan.  As the law currently stands, Federal 
criminal jurisdiction for crimes committed abroad in war zones encompasses only those PMCs 
that are employed by the Armed Forces, Department of Defense (DOD), or by another Federal 
                                                   
1 U.S. v. Slough, No. 09-0360, 2009 WL 51173785, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 31, 2009). 
2 Id. 
3 See Anthony Shadid, Biden Says U.S. Will Appeal Blackwater Case Dismissal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/24/world/middleeast/24iraq.html. 




agency to the extent that their employment supports a DOD mission overseas.5  The five accused 
Blackwater guards, however, worked on a contract to provide security for diplomats of the 
Department of State (DOS),6 potentially escaping through a liability loophole.  To ensure that all 
contractors who commit crimes in Iraq and Afghanistan can be prosecuted effectively in the 
United States, Congress must pass legislation to update Federal criminal law and fill the gaps 
that may leave certain types of contractors free from any criminal liability.  The Civilian 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2010 (CEJA) attempts to do just that, and while it may deter 
some PMCs from participating in the U.S. military and security contracting market, the benefits 
of having a fully accountable U.S. legal system outweigh the drawbacks for individual 
contracting companies.   
 
Background on the Increased Use of Private Military Contractors  
 The use of PMCs (also known as mercenaries, or private security contractors) in time of 
war is not a new phenomenon, and the United States has used them prior to the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  For example, the U.S. military hired private companies to build bases and handle 
non-combat tasks during the Vietnam War7 and to train South Vietnamese troops.8  Contracting 
was intended to be logistical in nature, as modern democratic governments found it difficult to 
handle supply, logistics, and manufacturing needs solely through the public sector.9  When the 
Cold War ended in the 1990s, reducing military costs became a major U.S. government goal,10 
                                                   
5 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, Pub. L. No. 106-523, 114 Stat. 2488 (2000) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 3261-7 (2004)). 
6 SUZANNE SIMONS, MASTER OF WAR 179 (2009). 
7 Id. at 66.   
8 Scott M. Sullivan, Private Force/Public Goods, 42 CONN. L. REV. 853, 859 (2010). 
9 SIMONS, supra note 6, at 66. 
10Craig S. Jordan, Who Will Guard the Guards? The Accountability of Private Military Contractors in Areas of 
Armed Conflict, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 309, 313 (2009). 
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and the Pentagon underwent significant cutbacks in standing troop levels.11  These reductions 
resulted in the outsourcing of many non-core functions and services to private contractors that 
had previously been performed by the military.12   
This U.S. trend in military and security privatization reached a high-water mark when 
President George W. Bush’s Administration began military action in Iraq and Afghanistan, a 
decision which culminated in the largest deployment of private military firms abroad in U.S. 
history.13  At a peak in September 2008, the total number of contractors in Iraq surpassed the 
total number of troops,14 while in Afghanistan the total number of contractors has exceeded troop 
levels since 2007.15  As recently as September 2009, the number of DOD contractors in Iraq 
totaled 114,000, compared with 130,000 troops on the ground.16  In Afghanistan the ratio 
approached 2:1 at the same point, with 104,000 DOD contractors for the 64,000 troops.17  These 
official totals do not distinguish between specific types of contractor duties such as base support 
or security services, and questions have been raised as to their reliability.18  However, they do 
illustrate the breadth of private presence that exists in these two war zones.  The numbers do not 
even include all those contracted by the other U.S. departments and agencies that employ PMCs 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, including DOS, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 
and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).19   
                                                   
11 SIMONS, supra note 6, at 65. 
12 Jordan, supra note 10.  
13 Sullivan, supra note 8, at 855. 
14 MOSHE SCHWARTZ, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S USE OF PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ AND 
AFGHANISTAN 1, 8 (Cong. Res. Serv. 2010). 
15 Id. at 11. 
16 MOSHE SCHWARTZ, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN 1, 5 (Cong. Res. Serv. 
2009). 
17 Id. 
18 SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, at 5.  




PMCs provide significant benefits to the U.S. government in that they can save money 
and they allow for increased flexibility.  Contractors can be hired on short notice and deployed 
quickly and are not required to be rotated out of war zones like soldiers.20  Employing them only 
as needed for the duration of a particular military or security need can be cheaper in the long run 
than maintaining a permanent internal force.21  Personnel costs are some of the largest military 
expenses,22 and providing veterans’ benefits such as retirement payments or tuition assistance for 
contractors is not required.  In addition, PMCs often possess important skill sets and expertise 
that are undercompensated in the public sector, and they can be drawn from local populations 
that more closely match indigenous culture than would the public force.23  In September 2009, a 
surprising 74% of DOD contractors in Iraq and 91% in Afghanistan were local and third-country 
nationals.24  By definition, PMCs can provide armed services like site, convoy, escort, or 
personal detail security, or they can provide unarmed security services such as operational 
coordination, intelligence analysis, hostage negotiations, or security training.25  Contracting out 
basic unarmed services can also make military personnel available for essential combat 
operations.26  Without the support of PMCs, departments including the DOD and DOS would not 
be able to execute their missions.27   
When the U.S. military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan escalated, U.S. government 
entities found themselves requiring protective security beyond their current capabilities.  In 
particular, the DOS, whose traditional role was one of a diplomat and whose Diplomatic Security 
                                                   
20 Sullivan, supra note 8, at 888. 
21 SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, at 5. 
22 Interview with U.S. Senate military aide in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 23, 2010).  He is an Iraq war veteran and 
holds a Juris Doctor. 
23 Sullivan, supra note 12, 889. 
24 SCHWARTZ, supra note 16, at 2. 
25 SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, at 2. 
26 SCHWARTZ, supra note 16, at 2. 
27 SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, at 5 (according to government officials). 
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Service was never meant to be a war zone security force, needed additional personnel to protect 
Ambassadors Paul Bremer and Patrick Kennedy who ran the Coalition Provisional Authority (the 
transitional government that followed the invasion of Iraq).28  This urgent need resulted in a slew 
of government contracts awarded on a non-competitive basis to the few companies who were 
able to fulfill them at the time.  The company Blackwater Worldwide was one of those few 
companies, rising from a small security consulting business founded by former Navy SEAL Erik 
Prince to a billion dollar government contractor meeting the needs of the DOS and of other 
departments.  Other companies that eventually contracted in Iraq and Afghanistan include Triple 
Canopy, Kellogg, Brown and Root, DynCorp International, and Military Professional Resources, 
Inc.29 
In 2008, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that, since the start of the war, U.S. 
agencies had awarded private contracts totaling $85 billion in Iraq and neighboring regions and 
$10 billion in Afghanistan.30  With such a massive PMC influx and presence in war zones, it is 
surprising that an extra arm of the U.S. military could operate with potential immunity from any 
criminal laws. 
 
United States v. Slough and its Fallout 
 One of the most negatively publicized incidents during the war in Iraq was a disputed 
Baghdad shooting in September 2007, which involved a convoy of U.S. PMCs.  These PMCs, 
part of the Blackwater Tactical Support Team, were contracted by the DOS to provide back-up 
                                                   
28 SIMONS, supra note 6, at 70. 
29 Renae Merle, Census Counts 100,000 Contractors in Iraq, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2006, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/04/AR2006120401311.html. 
30 SIMONS, supra note 6, at 255. 
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fire support to other Blackwater personal security details in Baghdad.31  On September 16, the 
convoy took up positions at a traffic circle in Nisoor Square to secure an evacuation route for 
American and Iraqi officials after a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device detonated near 
the compound at which they were meeting.32  Soon after, a shooting incident occurred, which the 
PMCs claimed was a self-defense response to an insurgent attack.  The U.S. government, 
however, maintained after its investigation that the violence was unprovoked and that the victims 
were unarmed.  Prosecution by the Department of Justice (DOJ) ultimately culminated in 
indictments for voluntary manslaughter and firearms violations, but the indictments were 
dismissed in December 2009 in the closely watched case U.S v. Slough because of evidentiary 
taint from prosecutorial case mismanagement.33 
Much of the intense Iraqi outrage over the shooting stemmed from the fact that Iraq had 
no legal recourse against the Blackwater contractors because they were immune from Iraq law.  
News of a U.S. District Court’s dismissal of criminal charges further fueled Iraqi anger.34  In the 
immediate aftermath of Nisoor Square, Iraq’s Interior Ministry claimed that the Blackwater 
PMCs had perpetrated a savage massacre, and the Iraqi government demanded millions in 
compensation for the victims’ families.35  Iraq subsequently revoked the company’s license to 
operate in the country, so the DOS was unable renew any of its security contracts with 
Blackwater in Iraq.  Blackwater received such bad press following the incident that it ultimately 
changed the company name to Xe Services, and its founder and CEO Erik Prince stepped down 
                                                   
31 U.S. v. Slough, No. 09-0360, 2009 WL 51173785, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 31, 2009). 
32 Id. 
33 See id. (holding that the defendants’ statements were compelled, and that the government failed to demonstrate 
both that the immunized statements did not influence its evidence and that their use was harmless error). 
34 Timothy Williams, Iraqis Angered as Blackwater Charges are Dropped, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/02/us/02blackwater.html?scp=5&sq=iraq%20reaction%20blackwater%20shootin
g%20decision&st=cse. 
35 SIMONS, supra note 6, at 181. 
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from day-to-day operations of the company in 2009.36  After the U.S. District Court’s dismissal 
of criminal charges, Iraq officials called the outcome unacceptable,37 and the Interior Minister 
even ordered 250 private security guards out of the country solely because they had worked for 
Blackwater at the time of the Nisoor Square shooting.38  The dismissal further strained U.S.-Iraq 
relations. 
In general, abuses by security forces and the associated social upheaval they cause can be 
a major factor in escalating insurgencies.39  For example, another deadly Blackwater shooting in 
May 2009 in Afghanistan turned the entire local neighborhood against the U.S. presence there 
and prompted one civilian witness to state “…if they keep killing civilians, I’m sure some 
Afghans will decide to become insurgents.”40  This disconcerting threat and the Iraqi government 
actions following alleged Blackwater abuses illustrate the significant consequences of PMC 
abuses abroad and highlight the importance of ensuring that the rule of law brings wrongdoers to 
justice when those abuses occur.  The local backlash affects not only Blackwater but also the 
PMC industry as a whole and the U.S. government’s ability to execute its mission effectively.   
As the dismissal of Slough shows, prosecuting the alleged criminal acts of PMCs under 
the existing legal authorities is problematic and potentially impossible in certain cases.  After a 
three week “Kastigar hearing,”41 U.S. District Judge Urbina found that the government’s case 
had been tainted by the use of compelled statements afforded Fifth Amendment immunity under 
                                                   
36 Mike Baker, Erik Prince, Blackwater Founder, Cutting Ties with Company, HUFFINGTON POST, Dec. 2, 2009, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/02/erik-prince-blackwater-fo_n_376880.html 
37 Iraq: U.S. Blackwater Case Dismissal “Unacceptable,” REUTERS, Jan. 1, 2010, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6000EP20100101 
38 Iraq Orders Blackwater Guards Out, THE SIASAT DAILY, Feb. 12, 2010, http://www.siasat.com/english/news/iraq-
orders-blackwater-guards-out 
39 U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, FM 3-24, COUNTERINSURGENCY (2006). 
40 David Zucchino, Deadly Contractor Incident Sours Afghans, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 13, 2009, 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/la-fg-afghan-contractors13-2009aug13,0,7816228.story?page=1 
41 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) (setting binding precedent requiring the government to prove that 
it made no use of immunized statements or that any such use was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). 
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Garrity v. New Jersey.42  The Blackwater defendants’ statements on the shooting were taken 
during interviews by their employers, the State Department Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), 
in accordance with reporting procedures outlined in a memorandum.43  Their sworn statements 
provided that “. . . disciplinary action, including dismissal from the Department’s Worldwide 
Personnel Protective Services contract, may be undertaken if I refuse to provide this statement or 
fail to do so fully and truthfully.”44  This language effectively ensured that the statements were 
compelled under threat of job loss.  The form also provided the language:  “. . . neither my 
statements nor any information or evidence gained by reason of my statements can be used 
against me in a criminal proceeding.”45  This prohibition ultimately thwarted the prosecution, as 
they could not avoid the influence of the incriminating statements that the defendants gave.  As 
the Judge summarized,  
In their zeal to bring charges against defendants in this case, the prosecutors and 
investigators aggressively sought out statements the defendants had been 
compelled to make to government investigators in the immediate aftermath of the 
shooting and in the subsequent investigation.  The government used the 
defendants’ compelled statements to guide its charging decisions, to formulate its 
theory of the case, to develop investigatory leads and, ultimately, to obtain the 
indictment in this case.46 
 
While at first blush this decision seems a result of prosecutorial mismanagement or 
incompetence, the reality is that prosecutors were hampered by the legal framework in their 
ability to make a case.  At the time of the incident, arrest authority was uncertain, and no 
formalized criminal investigative procedures existed.  None of the defendants were arrested.  
DOS agents merely interviewed the Blackwater convoy members for a “Memorandum Report of 
                                                   
42 U.S. v. Slough, No. 09-0360, 2009 WL 51173785 (D.D.C. Dec. 31, 2009) (citing Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 
493 (1967) (holding that prosecutors may not use statements compelled under threat of removal from office or use 
any information derived from those statements)).  
43 Id. at 4. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 1. 
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Interviews”47 and conducted an incident scene investigation in furtherance of the administrative 
inquiry.48  Two Army Colonels also examined the scene for evidence, but Federal Bureau of 
Investigations (FBI) investigators did not arrive in Baghdad until October, weeks after the 
shooting.49  Even once they arrived, the investigators were protected and transported outside the 
fortified Green Zone by contracted Blackwater security guards in an ironic twist and a potential 
conflict of interest.50 
 Even if Slough had made it to trial, a government victory was by no means certain 
because the defendants may not have fallen under the Federal jurisdiction necessary for the 
United States to prosecute.  The court may not have found that the defendants’ employment 
under State Department contract to protect diplomats “. . . support[ed] the mission of the DOD 
overseas.”51  This requirement, a statutory provision passed by Congress before the use of PMCs 
expanded, is untested in court and raises additional issues for any future prosecutions of DOS 
PMCs like Blackwater.  The Slough case is significant because it illuminates numerous legal 
issues and criminal procedural challenges that arise under the U.S. laws attempting to govern 
contractors in war zones.  It is necessary to identify and examine the legal authorities and their 
shortcomings.  
 
Legal Status and Authorities  
 The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (MEJA) legally recognized for the 
first time that civilians accompanying the military abroad fell within a jurisdictional loophole 
                                                   
47 Id. at 3.  
48 Id. at 5. 
49 Id. at 7.  
50 James Gordon Meek, Blackwater to Guard FBI Team Probing It, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 3, 2007, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/2007/10/03/2007-10-03_blackwater_to_guard_fbi_team_probing_it-
2.html. 
51 18 U.S.C. § 3261-7. 
10 
 
and attempted to bring them under Federal jurisdiction for criminal prosecution.  The statute 
provided Federal criminal jurisdiction for civilians who committed offenses punishable by more 
than one year in prison while employed or accompanied by the Armed Forces within the special 
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.52  This bipartisan legislation, sponsored by 
Senator Jeff Sessions (R-AL), was introduced in response to a juvenile dependant who escaped 
criminal liability after committing a sexual offense on a U.S. base in Germany.53  Since no action 
could be taken on the juvenile under German law, and because as a civilian he was not a U.S. 
Army member,54 his conviction was overturned by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit.55  The MEJA legislation was also spurred by a recommendation from the Overseas 
Jurisdiction Advisory Committee,56 which was established by Congress to study this 
jurisdictional issue after it had been routinely raised in oversight hearings and introduced for 
decades in bills that failed to pass both chambers of Congress.57  Senator Sessions’s introductory 
floor remarks indicate the extent of MEJA’s legislative intent: 
Because the military continues to rely heavily on civilian assistance and support, 
the United States must develop an appropriate and effective criminal process to 
deal with the misbehavior of civilians. It is important to the morale of our military 
forces that enlisted men and women working outside the United States along with 
civilian personnel do not believe that civilians who may commit a crime against 
them are beyond criminal prosecution.58 
  
 While the Act was clearly intended to bring civilians associated with the Armed Forces 
under the legal umbrella, it did not anticipate the extent to which agencies besides the military 
would contract with PMCs or the threat of criminal acts perpetrated by PMCs against the local 
                                                   
52 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, Pub. L. No. 106-523, 114 Stat. 2488 (2000) (prior to 2004 amendment). 
53 145 CONG. REC. S3635 (1999) (statement of Sen. Sessions). 
54 Id. 
55 H.R. REP. NO. 106-778 pt. 1, at 9 (2000).  
56 145 CONG. REC. S3635. 
57 H.R. REP. NO. 106-778 pt. 1, at 9. 
58 145 CONG. REC. S3635. 
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population during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  In response to the increased wartime use of 
PMCs in 2002, an amendment to MEJA was passed in 2004.59  As amended, MEJA now 
includes in Federal criminal jurisdiction not only civilian employees of the Department of 
Defense, but also contractors and employees of contractors of “. . . any other Federal agency, or 
any provisional authority, to the extent such employment relates to supporting the mission of the 
Department of Defense overseas.”60  However, this language is vague and untested by the 
courts,61 and it is unclear what would legally constitute employment supporting a DOD mission 
overseas.  In the five years of wartime since the MEJA amendment, PMCs have been hired by 
numerous U.S. agencies operating in Iraq and Afghanistan, for purposes other than supporting 
the Armed Forces.   
The scope of U.S. laws is significant because of the immunity that many PMCs still 
receive from Iraq and Afghanistan law.  Contractors in these countries operate under the 
domestic law of the host country, as well as the international order of the laws and usages of war, 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions, and treaties.62  The courts of Iraq and Afghanistan 
only have jurisdiction to prosecute PMCs pursuant to the applicable status of forces agreements 
(SOFA) with the United States, bilateral treaties establishing the framework under which the 
U.S. military will operate and addressing how domestic law will apply to U.S. military and 
personnel.63  A U.S.-Iraq SOFA authorized the Coalition Provisional Authority to function as the 
transitional government in Iraq, and in June 2003 that transitional government issued Order 17 to 
immunize contractors from Iraqi legal processes for acts performed under their contracts.64  
                                                   
59 Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 1088, 118 Stat. 1820 (2004). 
60 18 U.S.C. § 3267 (2004). 
61 ELSEA, supra note 18, at 1. 
62 Id. at 2. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 12. 
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When the CPA dissolved in June 2004, certain CPA orders like Order 17 remained in effect until 
the Iraqi government modified or rescinded them.65  While the Iraq government has negotiated 
over Order 17, it has not been formally rescinded.  A U.S.-Iraq Withdrawal Agreement that went 
into effect in January 2009, however, gave Iraq primary jurisdiction over DOD contractors and 
their employees.  This jurisdictional definition suffers from the same language problems that 
plague MEJA, covering only those who “…supply goods, services, and security in Iraq to or on 
behalf of the United States Forces under a contract or subcontract with or for the United States 
Forces.”66  It is unclear how this definition applies to contractors employed by the DOS and 
other U.S. agencies. 
In Afghanistan, PMCs are definitively afforded complete immunity from local laws.  
U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) personnel are governed by an exchange of notes 
between the two countries’ governments, and the NATO-led International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) is governed by a Military Technical Agreement in the country.  A 2002 OEF-
Afghan agreement covers U.S. military and DOD personnel, making them immune from 
criminal prosecution by Afghan authorities and explicitly authorizing the U.S. criminal 
jurisdiction.  ISAF’s Military Technical Agreement provides that all ISAF and supporting 
personnel are subject to exclusive jurisdiction of their own governments and immunity from 
arrest or detention by Afghan authorities. 
Other relevant legal authorities governing certain PMCs include DOD rules implemented 
under the authority of MEJA and its Uniform Military Code of Justice (UMCJ).  DOD rules 
                                                   
65 Id. 
66 Agreement on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of their Activities during 
their Temporary Presence in Iraq, U.S.-Iraq, Article 12, Nov. 17, 2008.  
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issued in 2005 and the UMCJ are still subject to the vague definitional requirements in MEJA,67 
despite language added to the UMCJ authorizing DOD action regarding “…persons serving with 
or accompanying an armed forces in the field” that was intended to address contractor issues.68  
Even Secretary of Defense Robert Gates cited in an official memorandum “a particular need for 
clarity regarding the legal framework that should govern a command response to any illegal 
activities by DOD civilian employees and DOD contractor personnel overseas with our Armed 
Forces.”69  In addition, a prosecution and trial of a civilian contractor by court-martial under 
UMCJ might face a Constitutional challenge, as the Supreme Court has previously said in dicta 
that courts-martial are never proper for the trial of civilians.70 
Even the international community has made a significant effort to clarify the legal 
responsibilities of PMCs.  A United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) working 
group drafted a new International Convention on the Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring of 
Private Military and Security Companies.71  Additionally, government experts from the United 
States and sixteen other countries created the Montreux Document, which sets forth best 
practices regarding the legal obligations of companies during armed conflicts.72  Among other 
things, the Montreux Document urges states to evaluate whether their legislation and 
procurement regulations are adequate to ensure accountability.73  In particular, contracting states 
                                                   
67 32 C.F.R. § 153 (2005) (implementing policies and procedures and assigning responsibilities under MEJA as 
amended for exercising extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction). 
68 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (as amended by the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364 (2006)).  
69 Secretary of Defense Memorandum on UMCJ Jurisdiction over DOD Civilian Employees, DOD Contractor 
Personnel, and Other Persons Serving with of Accompanying the Armed Forces Oversees during Declared War and 
in Contingency Operations (Mar. 10, 2008). 
70 O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969). 
71 ELSEA, supra note 18, at 8. 
72 See International Committee of the Red Cross, The Montreux Document, Aug. 2009 (The International Committee 
of the Red Cross is the only body that can produce authoritative commentaries  and interpretations of the Geneva 
Conventions). 
73 ELSEA, supra note 18, at 8. 
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are advised to provide for criminal and civil jurisdiction over activities of private military and 
security companies.74  
 
The Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2010 (CEJA) 
 Five years after the MEJA amendment attempted to close the criminal liability 
“loophole” for PMCs abroad and one month after a U.S. Federal court dismissed criminal 
indictments against five Blackwater PMC defendants, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) introduced 
the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2010 (CEJA) to definitively close jurisdictional 
gaps for certain contractors and to authorize additional investigative and reporting resources.75  
CEJA would add another section after MEJA in the U.S. Code that allows Federal criminal 
jurisdiction and prosecution for certain crimes for anyone “. . . employed by or accompanying 
any department or agency of the United States other than the Armed Forces.”76  This language is 
simple, but it effectively brings all PMCs employed by the U.S. government under the same 
umbrella.  No longer would there be a liability distinction based on the department or agency that 
contracts with a PMC.  For example, Blackwater PMCs under contract with the DOS would 
clearly fall within the statute. 
While Senator Leahy’s impetus for introducing this legislation might stem from his 
known opposition to the Iraq War, CEJA addresses a demonstrated criminal procedure problem 
with the current law as evidenced in Slough.  In his introductory remarks referencing Slough on 
the Senate floor, Senator Leahy stated, “I believe that, had jurisdiction for these offenses been 
clear, FBI agents would have been on the scene immediately, which could well have prevented 
                                                   
74 Id. at 11. 
75 Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2010, S. 2979, 111th Cong. (2010). 
76 S. 2979. 
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the problems that have plagued the case.”77  These comments connote the troublesome weeks-
long delay before FBI agents flew to Iraq to begin their investigation.  In addition to providing a 
jurisdiction clearly encompassing all contractors, the legislation would also establish 
“Investigative Units for Contractor and Employee Oversight” to investigate allegations of 
criminal offenses.78  Arrest authority would also be expanded from current law to include anyone 
serving in a law enforcement position in any U.S. department or agency,79 not just persons at the 
DOD.  These provisions attempt to provide additional resources that would improve upon the 
ambiguous investigative procedures that surrounded the Nisoor Square shooting.     
CEJA is not the first bill in recent Congresses to directly address liability shortcomings 
regarding PMCs in Iraq and Afghanistan, but because of its sponsor and its timing, the 
legislation has a good chance of passage.  Senator Leahy is Chairman of the Judiciary Committee 
to which the bill has been referred.  His Committee leadership position increases the likelihood 
that CEJA will be considered before and passed out of Committee for full consideration by the 
Senate.  Committee chairmen have significant influence in selecting the few bills, out of the 
many that are introduced, for consideration before the full Committee in a hearing or for a 
Committee vote.  
In addition, recent legislative history on the criminal jurisdiction loophole of PMCs 
demonstrates Congressional interest in the issue.  During the last Congress, then-Senator Barack 
Obama introduced legislation similar to CEJA titled The Security Contractor Accountability Act 
of 2007, and Congressman David Price (D-NC) introduced the MEJA Expansion and 
                                                   
77 156 CONG. REC. S442 (2010) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 




Enforcement Act of 2007 as a companion bill in the House of Representatives.80  Congressman 
Price’s bill passed in the House with a broad bipartisan majority of 389-30,81 but neither it nor 
Senator Obama’s bill was ultimately considered before the full Senate.  Congressman Price has 
reintroduced legislation as a companion bill to Senator Leahy’s CEJA in the 111th Congress that 
already has 31 cosponsors.82  Because the House comprises the same Democratic majority and 
passed similar legislation only two and a half years ago, it would likely support the same 
measure again.    
It is also clear that President Barack Obama still supports the idea of increasing 
accountability and liability for contractors through Congressional legislation.  As CEJA sponsor 
Senator Leahy noted, “President Obama has been working hard to restore America’s credibility 
in the world and our reputation for justice and our commitment to the rule of law.”83  The recent 
failed DOJ prosecution of Blackwater contractors increase the likelihood that President Obama 
will push for the legislation’s passage.  The Slough case demonstrated that convictions may not 
be possible in Federal Court under the current framework.  Finally, the likely announcement that 
the DOJ will reverse itself and attempt to prosecute 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheik-Mohammed 
in a military tribunal instead of a criminal court has drawn intellectual criticism.84  If such a 
policy reversal reaches fruition, the President may support CEJA in an attempt to build good will 
in the international community where some may be disappointed by that decision, by showing 
that the United States remains committed to the rule of law, even in difficult times of war. 
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 Expanding the scope of criminal liability for PMCs abroad has a number of positive 
international implications for the United States.  Conclusively bringing PMCs currently in Iraq 
and Afghanistan within the U.S. legal framework could provide those countries with greater 
confidence in the American legal system, and may allow the U.S. to execute its mission more 
effectively there.  It may be difficult for local Iraqis to distinguish between soldiers of the U.S. 
Armed Forces and PMCs because they can perform similar security functions, so holding PMCs 
to a high liability standard like that of soldiers under the UCMJ makes sense.  The Nisoor Square 
shooting has also demonstrated how anger over potentially unlawful incidents can be detrimental 
to the U.S. image and to U.S.-Iraqi relations.  The likelihood of insurgency spurred by such 
events may be decreased if the local population knows there is a clear pathway to bring those 
responsible to justice.   
 Additionally, creating a more clearly defined legal structure could avoid undesirable 
pressure from the international community.  The U.N. has already attempted to address the 
growing concern about PMCs85 and preempting any significant effort on their part is important to 
U.S. sovereignty.  “This is a nice way we can tell the rest of the world, ‘we’ve got it, we’ll take 
them home and rap their knuckles. We can hold up the conviction and say we punished our own. 
Our house is in order,’” stated a U.S. Senate military aide and Iraq war veteran.86  Passing CEJA 
would also lessen any argument by the international community or domestic factions for turning 
over criminal PMCs to host countries, to the U.N, or even to the International Criminal Court 
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(ICC).  While the United States is not a member of the ICC,87 U.N. pressure can still be 
influential, and it is in the U.S. interest to set and abide by its own rules. 
 Unambiguously establishing U.S. liability may also be reassuring for American 
contractors.  American PMCs are more familiar with the system of law and government of their 
homeland, and would presumably not want to be turned over to the U.N. or to what may pass for 
courts in the country in which they work.  Knowing there is no question as to how they would be 
handled or treated abroad may induce some contractors to work in semi-lawless countries.  With 
the increasing use of PMCs overseas, these implications exist not only for war zones, but for 
troubled areas like Haiti, Darfur, and the pirated Somali coast, which could all benefit from a 
contractor security presence.  This contractor presence was demonstrated recently when private 
security guards on a merchant vessel shot dead  a Somali pirate in the first killing of its kind, 
illuminating the legal jurisdictional question of to whom these newly utilized contractors are 
responsible.88 
 On the other hand, exposing all U.S. contractors abroad to criminal liability may worry 
and deter individual contractors from taking up much-needed employment in dangerous war 
zones.  This deterrent effect may apply to PMC companies as well.  According to a Senate aide, 
“In the short term I would admit that we’ll probably grind a few gears and experience some 
critical shortages in the area of contractor availability.  Or the few that stick around we’ll maybe 
pay them a little more in the short term.  There will be costs like that.”89  Instead of entering what 
can be a very lucrative market, PMCs may chose to focus their businesses on obtaining U.S. 
                                                   
87 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.  
88 Katharine Houreld, Private Guards Kill Somali Pirate for First Time, A.P., Mar. 24, 2010, 
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/world/private-guards-kill-a-somali-pirate-for-first-time-highlighting-lack-of-
regulation-89019362.html 
89 Interview with U.S. Senate military aide, supra note 22. 
19 
 
domestic contracts.  Conversely, they may decide to contract with other countries and foreign 
entities that do not impose any criminal restrictions on the actions of their employees.  It would 
make sense to watch the PMC market over the next few years if CEJA is passed to see if 
contractor availability is decreased in the long run. 
 While CEJA casts a broader net than MEJA, this wider international reach is justified.  
The rapid deployment of PMCs in the last decade has shown that it is difficult to anticipate and 
predict the extent of contractor usage.  In this sense, a broad statute avoids dealing with more 
unforeseen future problems in a piecemeal fashion.  Hemming in the United States in its ability 
to effectively govern its citizens, as DOJ prosecutors have experienced, is not an encouraging 
trend or phenomenon.  For the long term interests of U.S. rule of law and long term American 
credibility aboard, it is necessary to supplement the current statutory framework. 
 The privatization of certain security and military functions of the DOD, DOS, USAID, 
and CIA has been definitively established during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the 
tremendous use of PMCs is likely to continue.  A stabilizing U.S. presence in Iraq and 
Afghanistan will likely exist for many years even if President Obama withdraws the bulk of U.S. 
troops from those countries.  This presence, potentially for purposes of construction and nation 
building, could further prolong contractor use.90  The employment of PMCs might also become a 
useful tool in an effort to decrease troop numbers, because PMCs could be substituted for 
soldiers in order to bring down official numbers of U.S. troops abroad.  Now that PMCs are part 
of our system, it is necessary to treat them similarly and unambiguously under the rule of law.  
“Not to short these guys; they were necessary.  But reigning them in–it’s time–and it’s kind of 
normal.  The law is usually catching up.”91 
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 A legislative solution like CEJA would accomplish the equitable goal of equivalent 
treatment of PMCs in Iraq and Afghanistan.  While the increased scope of criminal liability may 
deter those contractors wary of or unwilling to comply, the systematic benefits of a clear U.S. 
commitment to the rule of law outweighs these costs.  On the whole, the credibility within the 
international community and the confidence of foreign governments and their local populations 
could increase the effectiveness and execution of the U.S. mission.  PMCs may be afforded more 
respect by the local populations and even by members of the U.S. Armed Forces with whom they 
collaborate and coordinate.  It is also in the U.S. interest to proactively administer and supervise 
its contractors abroad, as opposed to feeling pressure from outsiders to do so.  Based on recent 
failures to apply Federal criminal jurisdiction and prosecute PMCs in the Slough case, and the 
encouraging political prospects CEJA has in this Congress, we may soon see a clarification and 
complement to the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act and the current legal framework. 
